

PHILOSOPHY

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The problem of scientific paradoxes in the nominalistic philosophy of the 20–21 centuries

The article is devoted to the criticism of various nominalist approaches to solving the problem of paradoxes in modern science. Special attention is paid to the criticism raised at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries against two approaches: hierarchical and paraconsistent, which until recently were considered acceptable and promising. The aim of the paper is to show that the merit of modern research in this area is not in solving the problem of paradoxes, but in proving the inconsistency of the solutions proposed by the advocates of extreme nominalism in the 20th century. In this case, the following propositions are proved: S. Yablo's thesis that the hierarchical approach to solving this problem is not only excessive, but also useless; B. Slater's thesis that paraconsistent logic is impossible; G. Leibniz's thesis that the limits of applicability of the laws of logic are objective, and that extreme nominalism, denying this, itself becomes a source of paradoxes.

Key words: paradox, self-reference, ierarchical approach, paraconsistent logic, trivial logic, nominalism.

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